X3_NEAR_ROUTE_SHAPE
More than one leg, or a fallback. 1Click settles one swap, and a second leg could half-execute with no rollback.
The language
X3 Force Field begins with written typed `.x3` mandates and payment programs: compiler/type checks refuse unsafe edits, and NEAR Guard checks authenticated 1Click quote terms against policy. The deployed Guard does not run the native X3VM. Follow the public language tools, the recorded mainnet swap and the remaining work that connects source to execution.
The NEAR integration and the Rust intent toolchain establish different facts. The mainnet payment used Guard and 1Click; it is not evidence of native X3VM execution.
.x3 source
Mandate and payment
Compile
Parse, type-check, lower
Guard terms
Stored policy on NEAR
1Click quote
Signature, then terms
.x3 source
Strategies and programs
Rust compiler
HIR, MIR, backend
Intent bytecode
Separate from chain X3BC
Intent VM
Local execution and tests
These programs never reach a quote. Each code is a real refusal in the checker that the playground runs.
X3_NEAR_ROUTE_SHAPE
More than one leg, or a fallback. 1Click settles one swap, and a second leg could half-execute with no rollback.
X3_NEAR_SLIPPAGE_REQUIRED
No slippage bound. The compiler will not choose a tolerance on the agent's behalf.
X3_NEAR_TIMEOUT_REQUIRED
No timeout. The deadline is when 1Click starts refunding, so it has to be stated.
X3_NEAR_NONCE
A payment under a mandate with no one-use nonce, or with two. Guard records each payment under its nonce.
X3_NEAR_REFUND_ASSET
A refund in a different asset or on a different chain than the deposit. 1Click refunds the deposited asset only.
X3_NEAR_REFUND_TO
Timeout and on_fail refund to different addresses, or to an address that is not on the origin chain.
X3_NEAR_GUARD_UNENFORCEABLE
A require clause the NEAR path has no way to enforce. It is refused, never silently dropped.
X3_NEAR_ON_FAIL_UNSUPPORTED
on_fail halt or quarantine. 1Click can only refund, so the program would promise something that cannot happen.
X3_NEAR_ROUTE_ENDPOINTS
The leg's assets don't match the intent's from and to.
X3_MANDATE_APPROVAL
An agent listed as its own approver, an approval threshold above the cap, or an impossible threshold.
X3_MANDATE_BOUND
A mandate that leaves slippage or fees unbounded.
X3_MANDATE_LIMIT
A per-payment cap above the daily cap, or a cap that does not fit the contract's u128.
Reviewed November 13, 2026. Each component links to the source or execution record behind its claim.
The broader X3 chain has its own release and deployment requirements. Claims here use the public X3Lang revision and the network named in each evidence record. See Inspect the Proof.
Program-pin enforcement is proposed in PR #202 and is not merged at this evidence snapshot. Storing a source hash does not prove the deployed Guard rejects a different program. The meter waits for the implementation and mismatch tests to land.
NEAR FunctionCall-only and Base EIP-712 vault prototypes have local test coverage. The public testnet runbook still needs an allowed payment and the documented refusal cases. Neither the Tidepool transfer nor invoice_06 proves a scoped vault held the funds.
Compile the current and proposed mandate, then show the owner every term that changed (cap, recipients, refund address, expiry) before the create_mandate call goes out. The playground's checker can already produce both term sets.
Lower check_mandate to X3BC so the same bytecode runs in the browser, on the X3 chain and in the Guard. That removes the hand-kept ports and gives one parity test where there are three today.
An append-only feed of every agent proposal, with its .x3 hash, the verdict, the rule that decided it, and the transaction when there is one. Hostile-model runs would be labeled as attacks.
The same mandate shape, applied to liquidity: which pools an LP agent may enter, how much, the maximum price impact, and a fixed withdrawal address. Liquidity managed by an agent, bounded by the owner.
Want one of these sooner, or have a better one? Open an issue.