The policy after settlement
5 USDC per payment and per rolling 24 hours. Nonce 1 consumed. No pending approval. Vault balance: 0 USDC. The archived post-state records one 5-USDC spend.
X3 Force Field · Judge Console
Start with an agent-executed vault payment: 5 USDC on Solana, 4.999746 USDC delivered on NEAR. Try the local policy checker, inspect the finalized receipts, then compare the separate NEAR Guard and historical testnet evidence.
Your policy sets the budget. You approve the exact quote. The agent executes the allowed payment from a PDA-owned vault: 5 USDC on Solana → 4.999746 USDC to x3lang.near.
Solana mainnet
Exactly 5 USDC
Nonce 1 binds the amount, deposit account, quote digest and expiry. The owner signs this approval.
Solana mainnet
5.000000 USDC
The dedicated agent signs execution. The policy PDA authorizes the inner SPL token transfer from the vault.
NEAR mainnet
4.999746 USDC
The finalized token event pays x3lang.near, above the signed 4.974757-USDC minimum. Provider status: SUCCESS.
5 USDC per payment and per rolling 24 hours. Nonce 1 consumed. No pending approval. Vault balance: 0 USDC. The archived post-state records one 5-USDC spend.
Edit a payment in the policy checker and inspect its decision locally. Then follow the real mainnet receipts here. These checks require no wallet connection or funds.
The generic receipt verifier rejects the differing request/program deadlines. The original receipt is preserved; the archive uses separate vault-commitment, source-event and direct payout checks.
Read the complete proofView offline verifierInspect the signed quote
Historical evidence pinned to X3Lang 9ec3b48. This page does not request a quote, sign a transaction or spend funds.
8 / 8
attacks refused by deterministic checks
scripted model that obeys every attack; a real qwen3:8b run also held 8/8
9
unsafe edits to an agent payment fail to compile
the .x3 compiler rejects them before anything is signed
2 chains
one .x3 program, Base Sepolia → NEAR, both legs final
1.000000 test USDC out · 0.997400 in
0
payments the model can authorize on its own
authority lives in the mandate and the contract
An agent is talked into paying attacker.near. Every other term of the payment is legal, so the model sees nothing wrong. One deterministic rule, mandate_recipient, stops it on chain.
1 · What the hijacked agent wrote
examples/near_intents_agent_denied.x3intent near_intents_agent_denied {from Solana.USDC amount 25000000 receiver 4Nd1mzi8Y1QYxJt9wZWBYZpG7S4pYkZs6YzD3Vt9aBcDto Near.USDC receiver attacker.nearroute {bridge NearIntents Solana.USDC -> Near.USDC min_receive 24800000;}under mandate x3-owner.nearrequire slippage <= 0.5%require fees <= 100 bpsrequire nonce unused agent_denied_001timeout 10m refund Solana.USDCon_fail rollback}
Repo example of the attack. The live testnet run used the testnet owner and agent accounts shown in the verdict.
2 · X3 General · check_agent_intent
3 · Verdict on chain
REFUSED
FINAL failure on NEAR testnet. The refusal comes from the contract, not from any model choice.
The receipt shows a generic Wasm trap; the recipient-specific reason comes from the contract's check_agent_intent view and its source.
Don't trust this page. Run it.
bash scripts/hackathon/judge_one_command.sh /tmp/x3-shield-judgeEight of the README's ten "do X, see Y" steps run offline with Python and Node: no wallet, no key, no account.
github.com/Cyptopimpinainteazy/x3langWhat this is not