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NEAR competition

Unstoppable DeFi

What cross-chain transfer can a judge verify?

How .x3 fits

Guard checked an official signed 1Click quote on NEAR mainnet before a Solana USDC deposit. A separate historical Base Sepolia transfer demonstrates a committed .x3 source hash bound before funding.

The historical transfer program

intent x3_testnet_base_usdc_to_near {
    from BaseSepolia.USDC amount 1000000 receiver 0x5aF0c1BF95B3A158f6Fc48e3DED35903b2fa0721
    to Near.USDC receiver x3lang.testnet
    route {
        bridge NearIntents BaseSepolia.USDC -> Near.USDC min_receive 980000;
    }
    require slippage <= 1%
    require nonce unused x3_base_testnet_trade_001
    timeout 30m refund BaseSepolia.USDC to 0x5aF0c1BF95B3A158f6Fc48e3DED35903b2fa0721
    on_fail rollback
}

Amounts use token base units. These accounts are example or historical testnet identities; use the source guide before adapting a program.

What the evidence establishes

Published result

November 14 source-vault pilot: the agent deposited 5 USDC and 4.999746 USDC reached x3lang.near. Finalized source event/SPL CPI, NEAR token event and provider SUCCESS are archived. Earlier owner-funded invoice_06 and historical Tidepool testnet delivery remain separate.

Trust and limits

1Click status associates the mainnet deposit and payout; it is not cryptographic cross-chain causality. Guard did not custody funds. The historical Tidepool trade remains a separate trusted-relay testnet demonstration.

Next evidence: The Solana vault custody proof is published; source-RPC quorum, cryptographic solver causality and broader production validation remain open.

Reviewed November 13, 2026 against X3Lang f2a01a2.

Judge walkthrough

  1. Read the mandate and payment source. Identify recipient, asset, amount, nonce, deadline and refund terms.
  2. Run the local policy preview. Change the recipient to attacker.near and inspect the refusal; local results do not prove chain execution.
  3. Open the mainnet invoice_06 bundle and the separately labeled testnet records. Match each contract, transaction and network to its claim. Check that the two published .x3 files hash to the values Guard stores for invoice_06.
  4. For delivery, inspect the source and destination finalized records and the relay assumptions separately from Guard authorization.

Full judge guide